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I. Introduction  
Having been first envisaged and discussed as early as 1979 in a European Commission 
Memorandum,1 the European Union’s (EU)2 accession to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) seemed to be a never-ending story. In fact, accession appeared to be legally 
impossible after major setbacks such as Opinion 2/94 in which the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU) held that, as Union law stood back then, the EU had no competence to accede to the 
Convention.3 This deficit in competence has only been remedied in 2010, after a long-lasting 
struggle to put into force both the Lisbon Treaty4 and Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR,5 which 
granted the Union this very competence. This story came to an – albeit provisional – conclusion 
in April 2013, when a Final Report on accession was submitted to the Council of Europe’s 
Human Rights Steering Committee (CDDH). This report included a Draft Revised Agreement 
on EU accession to the ECHR and a Draft Explanatory Report to this agreement.6 After this 
overwhelming success, December 2014 nonetheless saw another blow to the accession project, 
when the CJEU held in Opinion 2/13 that the accession agreement was not compatible with the 
Union Treaties. For the Court, this incompatibility mainly lies in the agreement’s potential 
adverse effects on the specific characteristics and the autonomy of EU law.7 And although a re-
negotiation of the ‘problematic’ parts of the accession agreement and further delay in the 
finalization of the accession procedure seem inevitable, the author shares the optimism that 
Luxembourg’s verdict does not frustrate accession after all: hopefully, it will – in hindsight – 
remain an albeit irritating, yet mere bump on the road towards a unified system of European 
human rights protection. Nonetheless Opinion 2/13 primarily deals with the incompatibilities 
                                                 
1 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Memorandum on the Accession of the European Communities to 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, Bulletin, Supplement 2/79, 
COM (79) 210 final, 20 May 1979. 
2 For the sake of legibility, only the European Union is being referred to in this text, even if the terms ‘European 
Economic Community’ (EEC) or ‘European Community’ (EC) were legally and historically correct in lieu thereof. 
3 Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759, para 36. 
4 Cf. especially Article 6(2) TEU, both enabling and obliging the EU to accede to the Convention. 
5 Cf. especially Article 17 of Protocol No. 14, amending Article 59 ECHR, thus allowing for accession. 
6 Fifth Negotiation Meeting between the CDDH ad hoc Negotiation Group and the European Commission on the 
Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, Final Report to the CDDH, 
10 June 2013, 47+1(2013)008rev2. 
7 Opinion 2/13 EU Accession to the ECHR [2014] ECR I-(nyr), para 258. 
of accession on the legal order of the EU itself, which is not the focus of this chapter (and which 
deserves an analysis in its own right). The chapter at hand examines the consequences of 
accession on the EU Member States in general and the United Kingdom (UK) in particular, and 
Opinion 2/13 will therefore only be taken into account where it is relevant to the situation of 
the Member States. 
Given that the European Court of Human Right (ECtHR) currently lacks any jurisdiction 
ratione personae over the European Union,8 the overall object and purpose of EU accession to 
the ECHR is to close gaps in the European system of fundamental rights protection. After the 
EU continued to acquire competences in fields which had previously been the exclusive 
domaine réservé of the Member States, these gaps in human rights protection became most 
evident in cases where an EU Member State was obliged to implement Union law in violation 
of the Convention. The legal status quo before accession would, in such a case, not lead to a 
sanction of the actual ‘perpetrator’, namely the Union, but of the Member State implementing 
the legal act in question. This deficiency will, however, be redressed by the EU’s future 
accession to the Convention9 by formally binding the EU to the ECHR. 
Furthermore, accession is also intended to bring about a more coherent protection system 
and confirm the European Union’s standing as a community based on the rule of law,10 and as 
a legal order that is fully committed to respecting and promoting human rights. By acceding to 
the Convention, the EU will become subject to the external supervision of the Strasbourg 
Court11 which would then have the last say in human rights and which could hence ensure, in 
the event of normative conflicts, a coherent and uniform interpretation of these rights 
throughout Europe. This objective will be achieved by enabling individuals to submit individual 
complaints under Article 34 ECHR directly against the European Union in the case of an 
alleged violation of Convention rights12 – under the reservation, however, that the application 
of national standards of protection (through Article 53 ECHR) must not be used to compromise 
the level of protection provided for by the Charter or the supremacy, unity, and effectiveness 
of EU law.13  
                                                 
8 Cf. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland, Appl. no. 45036/98, ECHR 2005-VI, 
(2006) 42 E.H.R.R. 1, para 155. 
9 Paul Gragl, The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2013) 5. 
10 Hans Christian Krüger, ‘Reflections Concerning Accession of the European Communities to the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2002/2003) 21 Penn State International Law Review 89, 93-94 and 97. 
11 47+1(2013)008rev2 (n 6) Preamble, recital 5. 
12 Jean-Paul Jacqué, ‘The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 995, 1007; cf. also Article 1(b) of Protocol 8 to 
the EU Treaties. 
13 Opinion 2/13 (n 7) para 188. 
But despite these apparent benefits for individuals and the overall development of human 
rights protection in general, British scepticism towards European human rights law may further 
be fuelled by this unprecedented step in the history of international law. Today human rights in 
the UK are protected domestically by the Human Rights Act (HRA)14 which has attracted 
enormous criticism for giving an expansive effect to both the Convention rights and the ECtHR 
jurisprudence within UK law. This incorporation of an international human rights treaty into a 
domestic legal order has been criticized both because it shifts political power from the executive 
and legislative branches to the judiciary,15 and because it, allegedly, undermines Parliamentary 
sovereignty.16 ECtHR judgments, such as the now (in)famous Prisoner Voting Rights cases,17 
have led to allegations of illegitimate judicial activism on the part of the Strasbourg Court by 
casting ‘its shadow over the HRA’18 through section 2(1) HRA, obliging the UK courts to ‘take 
into account’ any relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence on a particular Convention right. 
Scepticism vis-à-vis ECtHR case law, coupled with increasing criticism of European Union law 
(most prominently of the division of competences between the EU and the UK, particularly in 
the field of the free movement of persons and so-called ‘social tourism’) clearly illustrate why 
EU accession to the ECHR may not be a very popular step in the UK: From a critical point of 
view, accession could not only further add delays to litigation by introducing new mechanisms 
and procedures before the ECtHR, 19  and entangle the UK legal order in a multi-layered 
labyrinth of European human rights,20 but also lead to a creeping transformation of both the 
Convention and Strasbourg’s jurisprudence into domestic law through the backdoor of the 
supremacy of EU law. In the eyes of the sceptics, EU accession to the ECHR could thus result 
‘in a tighter net forming around UK membership to the Convention creating a Gordian knot 
from which Britain would struggle to be freed.’21 
In the light of this considerable criticism, this chapter will therefore explore in part II the 
negative aspect of EU accession to the ECHR, or – in other words – what accession is not about: 
it is not about the Member States, but about the European Union itself and its subjection to the 
                                                 
14 Human Rights Act, 1998 c. 42. 
15 Keith D. Ewing, ‘The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 79, 79. 
16 Samantha Besson, ‘The Reception Process in Ireland and the United Kingdom’ in Helen Keller and Alec Stone 
Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 49-52. 
17 Hirst v the United Kingdom (No. 2), Appl. no. 74025/01, ECHR 2005-IX (2006) 42 E.H.R.R. 41; Greens and 
M.T. v the United Kingdom, Appl. nos 60041/08 and 60054/08, ECHR 2010-VI (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 21. 
18 Richard Bellamy, ‘Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act’ (2011) 9 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 86, 97. 
19 In concreto, the co-respondent mechanism and the prior involvement procedure, which will be discussed in 
detail below. 
20 HM Government, ‘Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union – Fundamental Rights’, 22 July 2014, § 5.11. 
21 Ibid, § 5.17. 
external scrutiny of the ECtHR. Moreover it is crucial to note that the UK’s membership in both 
the EU and the ECHR has already changed the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty, and that 
accession will not further negatively impact on the UK constitutional system. Accordingly, the 
argument that the European human rights system now encompasses too many layers of 
protection, would be further complicated by EU accession to the ECHR, will be rebutted. 
Subsequently, part III will examine the positive aspects of accession and demonstrate that 
its advantages outweigh the British fears by far. It will be analysed, especially, how the Member 
States might benefit from a – more or less – unified European human rights system in which 
only disputes between EU Member States might be exempt from Strasbourg’s jurisdiction.22 
After accession, sceptics cannot only expect a ‘tamer’ version of the EU, which will be subject 
to the external supervision of the ECtHR, but also a ‘truthful’ hierarchy through the 
‘unification’ of the Member States’ international obligations under EU and ECHR law: in 
contrast to cases such as Bosphorus,23 EU accession to the ECHR will prevent any future 
normative conflicts between EU law and the ECHR for the Member States, as the last say will 
in any case rest with the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
II. Tangled Hierarchies? Risk Assessment in the Light of the Status Quo 
Before analysing what (negative) impact EU accession to the ECHR may have on the UK, it is 
necessary to illustrate the legal reasons for the existing British scepticism towards accession, 
i.e. the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty and the dualist approach of the UK towards 
international treaty law. This illustration of the legal status quo will help explain how the 
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty has already been modified by the UK’s integration into 
both EU and ECHR law and by the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA)24 and the HRA. 
This chapter will then assess what risks accession might entail for the British constitution: 
whether accession will in fact add another layer of human rights protection, and thus further 
complicate the already intricate three-dimensional web of fundamental rights regimes,25 tangle 
the hierarchies of domestic and international law, and (allegedly) further erode the sovereignty 
of Parliament (for example by ‘smuggling’ the ECHR into domestic law as a Trojan horse of 
                                                 
22 Opinion 2/13 (n 7) paras 201-214; seeing that, upon accession, the ECHR will become an integral part of EU 
law, the CJEU claims to have exclusive jurisdiction in any dispute between EU Member States and between the 
Member States and the EU regarding compliance with the ECHR on the basis of Article 344 TFEU. 
23 Bosphorus v Ireland (n 8). 
24 European Communities Act, 1972 c. 68. 
25 Monica Claes and Šejla Imamović, ‘National Courts in the New European Fundamental Rights Architecture’ in 
Vasiliki Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris, and Vassilis Tzevelekos (eds), The EU Accession to the ECHR (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2014) 160. 
EU law, by complicating the works of domestic courts, and by empowering the EU at the 
expense of the Member States); or whether the focus and impact of accession is not on the 
Member States at all, but on the European Union itself and that thus there is no imminent risk 
for the UK legal order. 
A. British Exceptionalism: Parliamentary Sovereignty and Legal Dualism 
One reason for the UK’s protective approach of certain constitutional fundamentals vis-à-vis 
international law lies in Dicey’s ‘orthodox’ constitutional theory, according to which 
Parliament is supreme and sovereign and which subsequently entails that it has the exclusive 
right to make or unmake any law, or to override its legislation.26 Furthermore, the United 
Kingdom is – at least when it comes to treaties27 – the living proof of a dualist system. This 
means that the rights and obligations created by international treaties have no automatic effect 
in domestic law and that the supreme power of Parliament remains intact28 – a defensive attitude 
that is also directed against other international bodies of law, such as Union and Convention 
law. 
If, however, as emphasised in the Thoburn case, the Common Law accepted, inter alia, 
the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Communities Act 1972 as ‘constitutional’ 
statutes, which would be immune from implied (but not express) repeal by Parliament,29 a 
framework would already exist within which such superior constitutional norms could limit the 
authority of Parliament.30 This approach could provide a firm and clear basis for construing 
statutes in a way which does not impinge upon constitutional rights protected by the Common 
law. The courts may certainly not challenge the validity of legislation itself, but they could 
construe legislation in such a way to effectively minimize any interference with fundamental 
rights.31 Judicial review of primary legislation, however, remains – with two notable exceptions 
which will be discussed below – beyond the reach of the courts. 
Conflicts between international and constitutional law could then be resolved by 
consistent interpretation in the concrete case, and not on the basis of a normative hierarchy.32 
                                                 
26 Albert V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: MacMillan, 1902) 37-38. 
27 Customary international law is usually considered to form part of the Common law; cf. e.g., Ex Parte Pinochet 
(No. 1) [2000] 1 AC 61, 98; Ex Parte Pinochet (No. 3) [2000] 1 AC 147, 276; R v Jones [2006] UKHL 16. 
28 Anthony Aust, ‘United Kingdom’ in David Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: A 
Comparative Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 476-477. 
29 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151 [62] and [68]-[69]. 
30 Mark Elliott, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty and the New Constitutional Order: Legislative Freedom, Political 
Reality and Convention’ (2002) 22 Legal Studies 340, 369. 
31 Kenneth A. Armstrong, ‘United Kingdom – Divided on Sovereignty?’ in Neil Walker (ed), Sovereignty in 
Transition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) 337-338. 
32 Anne Peters and Ulrich K. Preuss, ‘International Relations and International Law’ in Mark Tushnet, Thomas 
Fleiner, and Cheryl Saunders (eds), Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (London: Routledge, 2013) 42. 
Prima facie, the same is also true for the ECHR and the EU Treaties, on the basis of which 
Parliament enacted both the ECA and the HRA and thus gave effect to the law of the EU and 
the ECHR – nonetheless with certain problems for the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
B. UK Membership in the European Union 
The ECA which gave effect to EU law within the United Kingdom is of unique interest to 
constitutional lawyers, as it raises the question whether the principle of supremacy of Union 
law brought about the end of Parliamentary sovereignty33 and thus that of the very ‘Grundnorm’ 
of British legislative power.34 The view that the ECA was conceived as an ordinary statute 
which was not intended to limit Parliamentary sovereignty 35  cannot be seriously upheld 
anymore. Proponents of the orthodox view may argue that section 2(1) ECA is the necessary 
constitutional turn of the tap which permits the flow of EU law into the UK legal order,36 as it 
states that legal acts under the Treaties shall be given legal effect in the UK. However, 
Parliament cannot simply pass another statute and thereby constrain the domestic effects of EU 
law by impliedly repealing the ECA,37 because this would not only conflict with the relevant 
CJEU case law on supremacy, 38  but also with the UK courts’ acceptance of that very 
supremacy39 and the alleged ‘constitutional’ nature of the ECA.40 Moreover, section 3(1) ECA 
expressly states that the meaning and effect of EU law is to be determined by the CJEU (which 
therefore has the last say on supremacy), while section 2(4) ECA practically obliges domestic 
courts to disapply primary legislation41 which is inconsistent with Union law.42 This means, in 
conclusion, that a partial change of the Hartian rule of recognition 43  or the Kelsenian 
‘Grundnorm’ of the British constitutional system44 has already taken place and that in the 
                                                 
33 FA Trindade, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Primacy of European Community Law’ (1972) 35 Modern 
Law Review 375, 375. 
34 Magdalena Martinez, National Sovereignty and International Organizations (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 1996) 
152. 
35 Felixstowe Dock v British Transport Docks Board [1976] CMLR 655. 
36 Armstrong (n 31) 330. 
37  Giuseppe Martinico and Oreste Pollicino, The Interaction between Europe’s Legal Systems (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2012) 118. 
38 First clarified in Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
39 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603. 
40 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council (n 299) [69]. 
41 Joseph Jaconelli, ‘Constitutional Review and Section 2(4) of the European Communities Act 1972’ (1979) 28 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 65, 67-69. 
42 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No 1) [1990] 2 AC 85; R v Secretary of State for 
Employment, ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1995] 1 AC 1. 
43 Sir William Wade, ‘Sovereignty – Revolution or Evolution?’ (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 568, 574. 
44 George Winterton, ‘The British Grundnorm: Parliamentary Sovereignty Revisited’ (1976) 92 Law Quarterly 
Review 591, 614-615. 
context of Union law Parliament’s will may no longer be entirely sovereign.45 In other words, 
on the basis of the ECA, EU law, in all its manifestations, may ‘freely flow’ into the UK legal 
order and prevail over the latter, as confirmed by section 18 of the European Union Act 2011.46 
Yet all of this has been done under Parliamentary authority and continues to be correctly done 
under valid law, at least as long as Parliament chooses to refrain from express repeal of the 
ECA 197247 and to withdraw from the EU under Article 50 TEU. 
 
C. UK Membership in the European Convention on Human Rights 
In contrast to the ECA, the HRA does not per se incorporate the international treaty in question 
– the Convention – into domestic law, but rather gives effect to certain ECHR provisions by 
giving a defined status to ‘Convention rights’ in the UK legal system.48 By domesticating the 
ECHR through substantive incorporation of only particular Convention provisions, the HRA 
remains a domestic statute placing European human rights norms in a constitutional context49 
without binding the domestic courts directly to the ECtHR. Under section 2(1) HRA domestic 
courts are merely required to ‘take into account’ Strasbourg case law. Accordingly it has been 
argued that the HRA does not conflict with Parliamentary sovereignty.50  
Nonetheless there is considerable scepticism vis-à-vis the HRA and Strasbourg’s 
jurisprudence which lies in section 3(1), providing that ‘so far as it is possible to do so’ 
legislation ‘must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights.’ 
The main difference between the ECA and the HRA is that Parliamentary Acts in contravention 
of the HRA are merely subject to a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ (section 4 HRA) which does 
not affect the validity, application, or enforcement of the law and accordingly respects 
Parliamentary sovereignty. As a result, the ultimate decision as to whether to amend the law 
rests with Parliament, and not the courts.51 However, the HRA’s real power rests more in 
interpretative techniques of conflict avoidance under section 3(1) than in declarations of 
incompatibility.52 Section 3(1) decrees a far-reaching interpretative obligation and thus may 
require the UK courts to depart from the textual meaning of legislation. In other words, it 
                                                 
45 Sir William Wade, ‘What Has Happened to the Sovereignty of Parliament?’ (1991) 107 Law Quarterly Review 
1, 2. 
46 European Union Act, 2011 c. 12. 
47 Neil MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 1, 3. 
48 Keith D. Ewing, ‘The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Sovereignty’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 79, 
84. 
49 Armstrong (n 31) 332-333. 
50 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [1999] QB 349. 
51 Alice Donald, Jane Gordon, and Philip Leach, ‘The UK and the European Court of Human Rights’, Equality 
and Human Rights Commission, Research Report 83 (London Metropolitan University, 2012) 23. 
52 Armstrong (n 31) 334. 
requires the courts to depart from Parliament’s legislative intention53 – a feature which does not 
sit easily with orthodox constitutional theory.54 One could certainly argue that when a court 
approaches the outermost boundary of its interpretative leeway, a declaration of incompatibility 
must be issued, since the use of section 3(1) HRA in such a case would inevitably cross the 
constitutional divide between interpreting and legislating.55 And although the introduction of 
the HRA certainly is an indication that a profound constitutional change has taken place,56 the 
broad terms of the HRA necessarily require elaboration by the courts in order to be applied to 
the circumstances of new cases.57 Lastly, this also means that if a court is issuing such a 
declaration, it is simply doing what Parliament has instructed it to do under section 4 HRA.58 
 
D. EU Accession to the ECHR: Adding Layers and Tangling Hierarchies? 
Seeing that both the ECA and the HRA have already considerably altered the UK’s 
constitutional landscape, we must now raise the question what this means for accession. Does 
it really add new legal layers of human rights protection to the existing system of the domestic 
plane (informed by both the ECA and the HRA), the EU level (consisting of the ‘general 
principles of law’ developed by the CJEU and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(EUCFR)), and the ‘Strasbourg regime’ (comprising the Convention and the ECtHR)? Does 
accession in fact tangle the hierarchies of domestic, European Union, and ECHR law, and thus 
further encroach upon Parliamentary sovereignty? The following sections will answer these 
questions by not only presenting and analysing the most persuasive arguments against 
accession, but also by showing that they can easily be rebutted. They will show that in fact, not 
much will actually change on the domestic level, as accession is about binding and constraining 
the EU, and not its Member States, and that any concerns for further intrusions into the doctrine 
of Parliamentary sovereignty are unfounded. 
i. ‘Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes’: The ECHR as a Trojan Horse in EU Law 
                                                 
53 Ghaidan v Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 3 WLR 113 [30]. 
54 Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) 96. 
55 Liora Lazarus et al., ‘Reconciling Domestic Superior Courts with the ECHR and the ECtHR: A Comparative 
Perspective’, Submission to the Commission on a Bill of Rights (University of Oxford, 2011) 70. 
56 Armstrong (n 31) 343. 
57 Aileen Kavanagh, ‘The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and Legislation under the Human Rights Act 
1998’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 259, 267. 
58 Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Anderson [2002] UKHL 46 [63]. 
There is considerable anxiety that the UK constitutional order will gradually lose full control 
of the ‘domesticated’ ECHR,59 i.e. the HRA and its domestic effects. It is feared that after EU 
accession the ECHR might assume similar features as EU law, namely direct effect and 
supremacy.60 The ‘gift’ of effective human rights protection under the ECHR is therefore – as 
in Virgil’s words in the title of this section61 – often seen as a Trojan horse, rampant to prevail 
over the UK constitution in the disguise of EU law. It is true that, upon accession, the EU will 
be bound under international law by the Convention. Pursuant to the settled case of the CJEU, 
the Convention will, as an international agreement entered into by the Union, also form an 
integral part of the EU legal order.62 Given its clear and precise provisions which are largely 
not subject to subsequent implementation measures 63  the Convention will thus – in its 
manifestation as EU law – also have direct effect in and supremacy over domestic law.64 Within 
the scope of application of European Union law, all national courts would become ‘human 
rights courts’ under the EU obligation to review domestic law in the light of the ECHR and 
therefore be obliged to enforce the ECHR within the interpretative boundaries of EU law by, 
for instance, disapplying contravening national law.65 The Convention rights would then not 
flow into the UK legal order through the interpretative filter-mechanism of the HRA, but 
through the fully opened tap of the ECA. This also implies that under section 3(1) ECA, the 
last say on this issue would rest with the CJEU which remains the ultimate guardian of Union 
law, including ‘unionized international law’.66 In the UK, this would extend the powers and 
responsibilities of the courts, which must, in the case of conflict with domestic law, set 
contravening law aside under the ECA, and not leave the review of compliance of primary 
legislation to Parliament.67 
However, things are not as intrusive as they seem at first glance, as the ECHR is already 
indirectly binding via EU law. Whenever Member States are implementing EU law 
(Article 51(1) EUCFR) or are acting ‘within the scope of EU law’, i.e. in all situations governed 
                                                 
59 Giuseppe Martinico, ‘Is the European Convention Going to be “Supreme”? A Comparative-Constitutional 
Overview of ECHR and EU Law before National Courts’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 401, 
424. 
60 Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems’ in Helen 
Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 681. 
61 Virgil, Aeneid, Book II, 49. 
62 Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State [1974] ECR 449, para 5; confirmed in Opinion 2/13 (n 7) para 180. 
63 Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, para 14. 
64 Gragl (n 9) 98-99. 
65 Claes and Imamović (n 25) 167. 
66 E.g., Case C-280/93 Germany v Council (Bananas – Common Organization of the Markets) [1994] ECR I-4973, 
para 144; and Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council (Market Access in Textile Products) [1999] ECR I-8395, paras 47 
et seq. 
67 Claes and Imamović (n 255) 167. 
by EU law,68 they are bound by the directly effective and supreme EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. And most importantly, under Article 52(3) EUCFR, the meaning and scope of those 
Charter rights which correspond to Convention rights shall be, at the minimum, the same as 
those laid down by the Convention (subject to a more extensive protection of fundamental rights 
by the EU). Furthermore, this same obligation to comply with EU fundamental rights which 
correspond to ECHR rights in the domestic application of Union law even existed before the 
Charter entered into force, namely through the general principles of EU law, which are 
informed by the ECHR,69  and are binding on both the Union and its Member States via 
Article 6(3) TEU.70 This means that even before accession, the UK courts are, within the scope 
of EU law, already bound by the ECHR71 and Strasbourg jurisprudence72 through the EUCFR 
under the duty of consistent interpretation in Article 52(3) EUCFR.73  
However, the crucial caveat is that, even though the ECHR may have the same effects as 
EU law, it can only have these effects qua EU law. In accordance with the CJEU’s judgment in 
Melloni,74 the CJEU held in Opinion 2/13 that Article 53 ECHR must not be interpreted as 
granting the Member States the power to guarantee a standard of protection that does not 
correspond to the Charter and a uniform interpretation and application of Union law. 75 
Furthermore Article 6(3) TEU ‘does not require the national court, in case of conflict between 
a provision of national law and the ECHR, to apply the provisions of that Convention directly, 
disapplying the provision of national law incompatible with the Convention.’76 Even if the 
CJEU changed its position and granted the ECHR supremacy and direct effect after accession,77 
this would still occur qua EU law and would not change the Member States’ situation in 
comparison with the status quo under Article 6(3) TEU.78 
The elephant in the room remains, nonetheless, a potential spill-over effect from EU 
competence into non-competence areas. In other words, the CJEU, may – as it has occasionally 
                                                 
68 Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Åkerberg Fransson [2014] ECR I-(nyr), para 19. 
69 Cf. e.g., Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, paras 41-45. 
70 Claes and Imamović (n 25) 167. 
71 Case C-400/10 PPU McB [2010] ECR I-8965, para 53; Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Schecke and Eifert 
[2010] ECR I-11063, paras 51-52. 
72 Case C-279/09 DEB [2010] ECR I-13849, para 35. 
73 This finding is all the more important after the CJEU’s judgment in Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. 
and M.E. [2011] ECR I-13905, paras 116-122 where the Court held that Protocol No. 30 to the Treaties does not 
exempt the UK from the obligation to comply with the Charter; cf. also Steve Peers, ‘The “Opt-Out” that Fell to 
Earth: The British and Polish Protocol Concerning the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 12 Human 
Rights Law Review 375, 384. 
74 Case C-399/11 Melloni [2013] ECR I-(nyr), paras 55-64. 
75 Opinion 2/13 (n 7) para 189. 
76 Case C-571/10 Kamberaj v IPES [2012] ECR I-(nyr), para 63. 
77 Giuseppe Bianco and Giuseppe Martinico, ‘Dialogue or Disobedience? On the Domestic Effects of the ECHR 
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done, e.g. in Åkerberg Fransson – more fully impose a fundamental rights review over Member 
State action and move beyond the application of fundamental rights within the scope of EU 
law. Such a competence creep is more likely in the area of fundamental rights than in other 
areas, because it is difficult to separate the different interlocking layers of European 
fundamental rights protection. On the other hand, the CJEU may be careful not to stretch its 
competence given the obvious opposition of the Member States. In fact, concerns regarding the 
creeping incorporation of the rights laid down in additional protocols to the ECHR which have 
not been ratified by the UK79 turn out to be unfounded. Admittedly, the Explanations to the 
Charter expressly state that their ‘reference to the ECHR covers both the Convention and the 
Protocols to it,’80 which enable the CJEU to take them into account as interpretative tools. 
However, although the CJEU referred to the relevant Strasbourg case law regarding the ne bis 
in idem principle and Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR in cases such as Åkerberg Fransson81 and 
Bonda,82 the Court only used both these Convention rights and the ECtHR case law in order to 
resolve difficult interpretative issues in the context of Article 50 EUCFR,83 which is binding on 
the Member States anyway. Accession will not change this status quo, as the EU will only 
accede to Protocols No. 1 and 6 to the ECHR under Article 1 of the Accession Agreement, 
simply because only these two Protocols have already been ratified by all EU Member States. 
In the end, there is no need for concerns at all in this regard, as most of the rights set forth in 
the additional protocols are also protected under the Charter (cf. e.g. Protocol No. 12 on non-
discrimination and Article 21 EUCFR, or Protocol No. 13 on the abolition of the death penalty 
in all times and Article 2 EUCFR).84 Thus in the context of additional protocols, no real legal 
issues arise for the UK. 
The European Commission correctly emphasized in its application for Opinion 2/13 that 
the pre-accession situation of the Member States in relation to the Convention must be 
preserved, as indicated in Article 2 of Protocol No. 8 to the Treaties, because some 
Member States have made reservations under Article 57 ECHR in respect of some provisions 
of the Convention or of one or more of the Protocols. Consequently, Article 1(3) of the 
Accession Agreement limits the scope of the Union’s commitments ratione personae to the EU 
alone, and accordingly, accession does not create any new obligations under Union law which 
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‘[go] beyond the scope of the pre-existing individual legal situations of the Member States in 
relation to the Convention and its protocols.’85  
In conclusion, the revolutionary change dreaded by UK sceptics will not happen upon 
accession, but has already occurred a long time ago, when the UK became a Member State of 
the ECHR and the EU. For the Member States, accession therefore rather seems like old wine 
in new bottles.86 
 
ii. Complicating the Work of National Courts 
Even before accession, national courts are often confronted with ambiguity of and the departure 
from previous jurisprudence by the Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts, which may be difficult 
to absorb into the domestic system. This is the case in particular if the CJEU or the ECtHR 
misunderstood the domestic law position.87 As the lynchpins in enforcing both the law of the 
EU and the Convention, the Member State courts are, to an increasing extent, confronted with 
two extremely intricate bodies of law which must be implemented on the national level.88 
Besides this already-existing complexity, accession is feared to bring about new procedural 
relationships and issues, and hitherto unknown dynamics, which could prove detrimental to the 
effective work of the UK courts and thus the overall protection of human rights.89 This tangling 
of hierarchies through such new procedural routes (e.g. by the prior involvement procedure, 
discussed below) may force individual litigants to incur enormous financial costs and 
procedural delays, which, at the end of the day, could prove more detrimental than beneficial 
to the cause of human rights protection. Moreover, whatever one might speculate as to what 
exact impact accession will have on national courts, it is noteworthy that the Accession 
Agreement fails to address this issue at all in order to not interfere with the division of 
competences between the EU and the Member States and thus the autonomy of the Union legal 
order. This means that domestic judges will have to work out these problems for themselves.90 
The main problem the Member States will face after accession is a scenario in which 
individuals allege that their fundamental rights have been violated, and where the courts must 
– if such a case is within the scope of EU law – decide whether or not to request a preliminary 
ruling from the CJEU. Member State courts of last resort are obliged under Article 267(3) 
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TFEU to request a preliminary ruling from Luxembourg when the interpretation of EU law in 
general or the validity of Union legislation are at issue,91 but these rules are not watertight: a 
domestic court may, for instance, assume that EU legislation in question was compatible with 
fundamental rights and consequently valid,92 and thus not request a preliminary ruling. Because 
individual applicants do not have a right to request a preliminary reference, they might submit 
their case directly to the ECtHR. Strasbourg would then be required to adjudicate upon the 
conformity of an EU act with human rights, without the CJEU having the opportunity to decide 
on the validity of a provision of secondary law or the interpretation of a provision of primary 
law first.93 However, the Accession Agreement foresees and addresses this scenario. In this 
event, the so-called ‘prior involvement procedure’ under Article 3(6) of the Accession 
Agreement would be triggered, under which Strasbourg has to afford the CJEU sufficient time 
to assess the compatibility of EU law with the Convention rights at issue, if it has not already 
done so before the ECtHR considers the case. This procedure will not only provide Luxembourg 
with the opportunity to interpret EU law before Strasbourg does so, but it will thus also comply 
with the requirement that local remedies be exhausted before the ECtHR accepts a case 
(Article 35(1) ECHR). Following Opinion 2/13, the prior involvement procedure must also 
ensure that it will not be the ECtHR deciding whether the CJEU has already given a ruling on 
the question at issue in that case, but the competent EU institution, and that the scope of the 
procedure will not solely be limited to questions of validity of secondary law, but to its 
interpretation as well.94 
A major concern of the domestic courts is lengthy litigation which would be caused by 
involving three court systems, and the cost of justice being delayed. The UK courts will of 
course have an interest in having such cases off their dockets as fast as possible, and passing 
them on to either the ECtHR or the CJEU (although the case will return from the latter court), 
and not to further increase their workload. Lastly, domestic courts will also struggle with the 
question of overlapping fundamental rights catalogues and the question when to apply which 
body of law and the consequences which this will entail.95  
However, none of these concerns is caused or further worsened by accession: firstly, the 
UK courts already are under the obligation to request a preliminary ruling in cases where 
Article 267(3) TFEU is applicable, which will prevent the triggering of the prior involvement 
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procedure and hence not differ from the status quo. If, however, the prior involvement 
mechanism is initiated, the Explanatory Report to the Accession Agreement provides that the 
CJEU shall ensure that its rulings are delivered quickly in order not to unduly delay the 
proceedings in Strasbourg. Such accelerated procedures before the CJEU already exist, e.g. the 
expedited preliminary ruling procedure under Article 23(a) of the CJEU Statute and Article 105 
of the CJEU Rules of Procedure, which allow the Luxembourg Court to give rulings within six 
to eight months.96 In comparison with the overall length of proceedings, this rather short period 
of time appears to be a minimal price to pay for a more effective protection of human rights. 
Finally, sceptics must also accept that the combined application of overlapping fundamental 
rights catalogues is not a new phenomenon brought about by accession: even today, the Member 
State courts are already confronted with minimally three spheres of human rights protection 
and must accordingly deal with an intricate system of multilevel human rights protection. So 
far, the UK courts have fared well in this respect, particularly by interpreting the relevant 
domestic piece of legislation (the ECA and the HRA) in consistency with the EU Treaties and 
the Convention. Hence there is no reason why this should change for the worse after accession 
and the introduction of the prior involvement procedure. 
 
iii. EU Competence Creep, in Particular through Positive Obligations 
One of the major reasons for British scepticism towards EU accession to the ECHR lies in the 
minefield that is the division of competences between the Union and the Member States. The 
first concern is the EU’s potential gain of competences at the expense of the Member States in 
the course of accession. The second concern is that, subsequently, Parliamentary sovereignty 
could be further undermined by EU law imposing positive obligations on the UK and thus to 
enact relevant legislation. Such an effect on Member State competences is above all seen in the 
thorny field of social rights97 – especially because of the ECtHR’s continuing reading of such 
obligations into the Convention. 98  Seeing that the Union in any event has only little 
competence99 in the area of fundamental rights protection,100 the possible imposition of positive 
obligations on the EU (which would then be subsequently ‘passed on’ to the Member States) 
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upon accession sits uncomfortably with the sceptics who consider this an excessive intrusion 
upon national sovereignty.101 And even though the CJEU declared that respect for fundamental 
rights cannot ‘have the effect of extending the scope of the Treaty provisions beyond the 
competences of the [Union]’,102 these anxieties persisted. As the EU will assume the same 
duties as its Member States under Article 1 ECHR to secure the Convention rights to everyone 
within its jurisdiction, the ECtHR can only be expected to apply consistent reasoning and thus 
claim that merely refraining from violations may be insufficient.103 
In order to alleviate these anxieties, Article 6(2) TEU not only sets forth the competence 
and obligation of the EU to accede to the Convention, but also provides that accession ‘shall 
not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.’ This assurance is almost 
verbatim reiterated in Article 2 of Protocol No. 8 to the Treaties, according to which the 
Accession Agreement ‘shall ensure that accession […] shall not affect the competences of the 
Union or the powers of its institutions.’ This requirement was duly taken into account by the 
drafters of the Accession Agreement and is now reflected in its Article 1(3) which reads that 
‘[n]othing in the Convention or the protocols thereto shall require the European Union to 
perform an act or adopt a measure for which it has no competence under European Union law.’  
Nonetheless, sceptics might interject that all human rights, even those outside the Union’s 
competences, could hypothetically be relevant for the EU and the Member States, as the 
example of Regulation 1236/2005/EC104 demonstrates in the area of the free movement of 
goods, as it prohibits the transfer of instruments which could be used for torturing. 105 
Subsequently, the ECtHR could, after accession, determine that the Union has violated the 
Convention by not enacting a particular piece of legislation. And if this very piece of legislation 
were not to fall into EU competence, the competence in this field of law might implicitly shift 
to the Union at the expense of the Member States106 – which may subsequently lead to an 
obligation under EU law for the UK to implement the relevant Union rules or adopt relevant 
legislation under the EU’s aegis.  
However, this is incorrect for a number of reasons. First of all, the Union is, in the exercise 
of its competences, very restricted due to the principle of conferral in Article 5(2) TEU which 
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permits the EU only to act within the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in 
the Treaties. Any competences not conferred upon the EU in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States. This corresponds to Article 1(1) TEU, underscoring the position of the Member 
States as ‘Masters of the Treaties’ which have voluntarily conferred competences upon the EU. 
Thus, given the EU’s lack of legislative Kompetenz-Kompetenz (i.e. the competence to extend 
its own legislative powers without Member State consent), it is unlikely that an international 
court such as the ECtHR could interfere with the division of competences between Member 
States and the EU and unilaterally change this balance of powers. This would evoke severe 
criticism on part of the Member States, in the light of the Lissabon 107  and Honeywell108 
decisions of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, and the UK would definitely not stand 
alone in such an event. Moreover, the CJEU itself held in its Opinion 1/91 that it will neither 
accept any external interference with the Union-internal division of competences,109 nor any 
hidden amendments to the Treaties in international agreements.110 
Lastly, even if a question regarding any positive obligations of the Union outside its 
competences arose in Strasbourg, the Member State in question may subsequently join the EU 
as co-respondent under Article 3(3) of the Accession Agreement.111 In this case, the ECtHR 
would then hold the Member State and the EU jointly responsible, pursuant to Article 3(7) of 
the Accession Agreement, without the further need of adjudicating on the allocation of powers. 
The respondents may then decide how to remedy the violation of the Convention on the basis 
of EU law and Strasbourg would not ‘clandestinely’ afford the EU additional competences at 
the expense of the Member States. 112  In Opinion 2/13, the CJEU voiced concerns that 
Article 3(7) would not preclude a Member State from being held responsible for the violation 
of a provision of the ECHR to which that Member State may have made a reservation under 
Article 57 ECHR.113 This, however, is logically impossible, given that the EU can only join 
proceedings as co-respondent where there is a Member State as respondent. This presupposes 
that the Member States is under an obligation under the Convention, and has – in other words 
– not made a reservation in the first place. This problem therefore seems to be pre-empted on 
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the basis of the ECHR anyway.114 This means, in conclusion, that accession will not have any 
effect of imposing obligations on the EU which are beyond the scope of its competences,115 and 
that any anxieties regarding the further undermining of Parliamentary sovereignty in the UK 
are unfounded. 
 
III. Truthful Hierarchies: The Benefits of Accession  
 
After having applied some relieving balm on the sceptics’ doubts regarding accession, the 
present section will now analyse its positive aspects and show that the advantages of accession 
will outweigh any fears of the Member States by far. Given the absence of a codified UK 
Constitution, it may be more difficult for the British than for representatives of Continental 
legal orders to accept that a constitutional debate can result in a single document116 which 
unifies and hierarchizes a multitude of legal bodies, such as the ECHR, the EU, and the Member 
States. The status quo of these three bodies of law is shaped by a heterarchical plurality of legal 
systems, where there is no ultimate authority to decide which system would prevail in the case 
of conflicts, and each system will ultimately resolve such clashes by confirming its own 
autonomy and supremacy.117 The advantage of accession is, however, that it will unify the 
European human rights system and give Strasbourg the last say in matters of human rights, 
make the EU and its Member States equal partners in proceedings before the ECtHR (which 
would also prevent future normative conflicts between EU law and the ECHR), and establish 
clear legal hierarchies, which may ideally simplify the current pluralist status quo of European 
human rights law. The following subsections will demonstrate how the Member States, 
including the UK, will benefit from this unified and hierarchized system. 
 
A. External Scrutiny and the Taming of the Shrew 
It is evident that the EUCFR cannot compensate for the added value of an impartial, objective, 
and external scrutiny by an international court118 such as the ECtHR. Moreover, accession 
would also remove the increasing contradiction between the human rights commitments 
required from future EU Member States and the Union’s lack of accountability vis-à-vis the 
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ECtHR. 119  Otherwise, it would remain highly hypocritical to make ratification of the 
Convention a condition for EU membership, when the Union itself is exempt from Strasbourg’s 
scrutiny. 120  This is all the more important in situations where there is no Member State 
involvement, but only action by the EU. This presents considerable gaps in the protection by 
the ECtHR.121 In the Connolly case, for example, Strasbourg found that the alleged violation 
was not attributable to any Member State, nor was the EU bound (yet) by the ECHR.122 A 
similar gap can be seen in the Biret case in which an importer attempted to claim damages from 
the Union for an embargo against the importation of US beef, and failed before the CJEU.123 
When the company subsequently claimed an infringement of its procedural rights under 
Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, because it did not have a chance to directly challenge the relevant EU 
directives before the CJEU, the ECtHR concluded that these violations related solely to deficits 
in the judicial protection offered by the European Union and were thus not attributable to the 
Member States. Due to this lack of jurisdiction ratione personae over the EU, the case was 
declared inadmissible.124 Accession will eventually close this gap in the external scrutiny of the 
ECtHR, as the EU will subsequently be directly responsible in such cases.125 
In this respect, sceptics might dread that the Member States will be subject to new 
constraints under EU law in relation to the Convention, and that due to the increasingly 
interwoven European human rights system after accession, it will solely be the CJEU that will 
take the role of the national courts in the international human rights discourse. Yet it remains 
nonetheless incorrect to assume that the Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts are the only two 
European courts, to the exclusion of national courts, as both will continue to depend on the 
support of the Member State courts.126 After navigating at the fringes of the scope of application 
of Union law in Åkerberg Fransson,127 the CJEU aptly proved in a couple of recent decisions 
that certain fundamental rights matters are better left with the relevant Member State 
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authorities, provided they conform to the principle of proportionality, 128  respect EU 
fundamental rights as yardsticks when acting within the limits of their national procedural 
autonomy,129 and where they act outside the scope of Union law.130 These cases reveal that 
Luxembourg is not as intrusive as often presented and that it does not unnecessarily intervene 
in questions of national law.131 Accordingly, there is no reason to assume that this approach 
would change after accession. 
In fact, accession could prove very beneficial for the UK in terms of a feared EU 
competence creep. Accession is expected to bring forth a ‘tamer’ version of the EU, because it 
is subjected to the external jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court. Given this new scrutiny of EU 
legal acts by the ECtHR, it is doubtful whether the CJEU or any other Union institution would 
attempt to claim any new competences at the expense of the Member States. Even though new 
competences would primarily mean additional powers in legislating and adjudicating, they 
would also include new responsibilities. These might, eventually, lead to an increased number 
of judgments against the European Union in Strasbourg. As a matter of fact, the Bosphorus case 
in itself should be a reason for the UK to support accession: if the EU did not accede to the 
Convention and the Member States were to implement future EU legislation in violation of the 
ECHR, there is a risk of Member States being held accountable by the ECtHR for human rights 
violations of the EU. Currently this possibility is mitigated by the presumption that the Union 
protects fundamental rights in a manner equivalent to that for which the Convention provides 
as a result of which the ECtHR restricts its review of Member States’ responsibility for EU 
acts.132 But there is no guarantee that the ECtHR will not depart from this presumption in the 
future, even in a non-accession scenario. In such an event, the UK, or any other Member State, 
would stand alone in Strasbourg, and would be required to take the entire blame for the 
implementation of EU law in contravention to the ECHR. After accession, however, both the 
Member State in question and the Union will have the right to defend their actions as equal 
partners before the ECtHR. 
 
B. The Co-Respondent Mechanism: Equal Partners in Strasbourg 
To the chagrin of many law students, the EU’s specific legal status as a non-State entity of 
quasi-federal character is highly complicated, as the ‘federation’ (EU) legislates and the ‘states’ 
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(Member States) implement such legislation, 133  and, conversely, the ‘states’ enact the 
‘federation’s’ constitution (the Treaties) and the latter implements it. After accession, when 
questions regarding the compatibility of national measures with the Convention arise, 
individual applicants will have to face the question of responsibility: is the Member State which 
enacted the measure responsible for the alleged human rights violation, or can the EU be held 
responsible for the underlying EU legal act which the Member State authorities had to apply?134 
In order to ensure that individual applications will be correctly addressed to the Member States 
and/or the Union as appropriate (Article 1(b) of Protocol No. 8 to the Treaties), Article 3 of the 
Accession Agreement introduces the so-called co-respondent mechanism. Under this new 
mechanism, the Member States may join the EU as co-respondents in proceedings before the 
ECtHR, if a primary EU law provision is allegedly in violation of the Convention (Article 3(3)); 
or the EU may join one or more Member States as co-respondent, if a provision of primary or 
secondary EU law is allegedly infringing the ECHR, and this alleged infringement could have 
only been avoided by a Member State by disregarding an obligation under Union law (e.g., 
when an EU law provision leaves no discretion to a Member State as to its implementation at 
the national level) (Article 3(2)).135 
It is particularly this latter scenario which is of specific interest to the Member States. In 
Opinion 2/13, the CJEU criticized in an overly strict manner that the ECtHR’s power to decide 
on a request from the EU to intervene as co-respondent under Article 3(5) of the Accession 
Agreement is incompatible with EU law. 136  Luxembourg sees this incompatibility in the 
ECtHR’s right to ask for reasons for the intervention from which it can subsequently deduce 
that the conditions for the EU’s participation in the procedure are met. In carrying out such a 
review, the ECtHR would be prompted to interfere with the EU’s legal autonomy when 
determining which entity is the correct respondent and how responsibility should be allocated 
between the EU and the Member States on the basis of their division of powers.137 This, 
however, is not true. Article 3(5) constrains Strasbourg to merely assess such a request to the 
extent whether it is plausible in the light of Articles 3(2) and (3). ‘Plausible’ is not a very 
persuasive or powerful word and would consequently not require the ECtHR to immerse itself 
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into the internal division of competences between the EU and the Member States. This also 
means that no competence creep at the expense of the Member States may occur after accession, 
e.g. by the ECtHR deciding on the Union-internal division of competences. 138  More 
importantly, cases such as Matthews, 139  Bosphorus, 140  and Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij 141 
illustrate that this mechanism will be applied only in a limited number of cases. 142 
Consequently, in the light of potential normative conflicts where the Member States can only 
implement EU law by simultaneously violating the ECHR, it is in their own interest that this 
mechanism will enable the EU as the legislator of secondary law, and thus as the actual 
‘perpetrator,’ to join the proceedings and to share the responsibility for the infringement of 
Convention rights. 
Lastly, the sceptics might interject that the UK would not benefit from the co-respondent 
mechanism because the EU would be able to refuse to join the proceedings because of its 
voluntary nature under Article 3(5) of the Accession Agreement. This must be criticized 
because of its sub-optimal results regarding the efficiency of individual human rights 
protection.143 Yet, even though the co-respondent mechanism will be voluntary as a matter of 
international law, 144  this issue may look differently from the perspective of EU law: the 
principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) obliges both the Union and the Member 
States to assist each other in carrying out the tasks which flow from the Treaties. This was also 
confirmed by the CJEU when it held that the Union has an interest in compliance by both the 
Union itself and its Member States with the commitments entered into under international 
agreements.145 Hence it can be easily argued that the EU would also have an obligation under 
Union law to join the proceedings as co-respondent146 in order to assist the Member State in 
question. 
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The main benefit of accession for the UK would therefore lie in its ‘unifying’ effect of 
the Member States’ international obligations under both EU and ECHR law: in contrast to cases 
such as Bosphorus, where the Member States were left no discretion, EU accession to the ECHR 
will prevent any future normative conflicts for the Member States, as the last say will in any 
case rest with the ECtHR – which might also lead to a judgment against the European Union, 
the polity actually responsible for an alleged human rights violation. 
 
C. Truthful Hierarchies Instead of Pluralist Enmeshments 
The final argument in favour of accession presented here relates to establishing a genuine and 
truthful hierarchical system of European human rights protection. The current heterarchically 
informed pluralist structure of domestic, EU, and international law is practically unable to 
account for fundamentally hierarchical concepts in non-domestic law,147 such as the direct 
effect and supremacy of EU law,148 the obligation to disapply domestic law in contravention to 
Union law,149  and Luxembourg’s monopoly on declaring EU acts invalid; 150  the ECHR’s 
existence beyond the jurisdiction of the High Contracting Parties, 151  Strasbourg’s – albeit 
limited – competence to exercise and supervise functions traditionally reserved to States,152 and 
the ECtHR’s power to adopt binding judgments, to award compensation, and, if appropriate, to 
require the respondent party to take general measures in its domestic legal order to put an end 
to the violation found by the Court and to redress the effects.153 
The continuing talk about ‘legal’, ‘constitutional’, and ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ to 
describe the status quo may seem very appealing in terms of a non-organized spirit of 
cooperation, judicial dialogue, and avoidance of normative conflicts. In fact, however, these 
pluralist enmeshments of three legal orders without any clear-cut hierarchy are unable to solve 
normative conflicts,154 continuously erode the rule of law and any legal certainty,155 and merely 
provide a disaggregating legal patchwork quilt instead of a rational and intelligible unity of 
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law.156 Furthermore, the desire for legal pluralism on the part of some Member States cannot 
detract from the fact that national courts are nonetheless already bound by EU fundamental 
rights and Luxembourg’s case law, and, therefore have to give them supremacy in their legal 
orders. In the case of normative conflicts, they cannot, as a matter of EU law, let their respective 
constitutional laws prevail without infringing their obligations under international or EU law.157 
Upon accession, the CJEU will find itself in a position similar to that of any Constitutional 
or Supreme Court of the Member States vis-à-vis Strasbourg, and the EU – in its entirety – will 
be subordinate to the international legal system of the Convention.158 In particular the prior 
involvement procedure under Article 3(6) of the Accession Agreement contains a quasi-federal 
element by giving the CJEU the opportunity to step in as the Union’s ‘supreme court’ and to 
guarantee the uniform interpretation and application of EU law. This court-centric approach is 
by no means pluralist, but rather undoubtedly constitutionalist,159 and despite the negative 
outcome of Opinion 2/13, the entire endeavour of accession conveys the overwhelming 
impression that all judicial and political actors involved are willing to create formal links 
between the two European institutions rather than perpetuate the current status of informal 
coordination, non-binding dialogue, and pluralist uncertainty. It is, without doubt, more 
desirable for the UK to establish an explicitly coherent fundamental rights order than to 
maintain a system of multiple conflicting orders. With the ECtHR at the apex of the future 
European human rights edifice, a clear-cut judicial hierarchy will not encroach either upon 
national or Parliamentary sovereignty, but bring more coherence and legal certainty to 
fundamental rights protection.160 Eventually, it seems that accession is a crucial tool in bringing 
an end to the deficiencies of legal pluralism. Legal pluralists might object that the structure of 
the post-accession order bears resemblance to Neil MacCormick’s pluralism under international 
law, according to which both the Member States and the European Union both cohere within a 
common legal universe governed by international law and thus within a monistic framework.161 
MacCormick admits, however, that this particular strand of pluralism is in fact just an 
instance of Kelsenian monism, with the notable exception that both the Member State and EU 
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legal orders enjoy equal ranks juxtaposed with one another, only subordinated to international 
law.162 EU accession to the ECHR should therefore rather be seen as crucial to realize Kelsen’s 
monism of legal hierarchies, which regards international and domestic law as parts of a single 
unified legal order.163 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
There are two ways of regarding the European Union’s accession to the Convention. One view 
would be to dread this step as a further encroachment upon the Member States’ sovereignty in 
general and the Parliamentary sovereignty of the UK in particular. However, as Lady Justice 
Arden correctly states, we tend to react to certain controversial cases on the European level on 
an unreflected ad hoc basis instead of thinking in a long-term way about a thriving and 
beneficial relationship in its entirety164 One should therefore not jump to any conclusions and 
not forget another view: namely that the UK became part of the European system of human 
rights protection at its inception and that EU accession to the ECHR is not about further 
restricting Member State competences, but about closing the last gap in the already close-
meshed web of European human rights law. In fact, if sceptics fear the subversion of the British 
constitutional order by the EU and the ECHR, then they should accept that this revolution has 
already happened when the UK became a member of these two supranational systems.    
As this chapter has shown, accession does not entail any significant risks for the British 
constitution: EU accession to the ECHR neither adds another layer of human rights protection, 
nor does it further complicate the three-dimensional web of fundamental rights regimes. 
Moreover, it will not tangle the hierarchies of the dualist UK legal order, which can only give 
effect to the law of the EU and the ECHR via the enactment of domestic legislation (i.e. the 
HRA and the ECA), and international law. Hence it does not erode further the sovereignty of 
Parliament. Accession is about ‘taming’ the EU and subjecting it to Strasbourg’s external 
scrutiny, and not about further limiting Member State sovereignty. Therefore the Member 
States, including the United Kingdom, should welcome accession as a pivotal move in the right 
direction. Accession does not take away any powers from the Member States; on the contrary, 
it will remedy the shortcomings of a currently pluralist system by unifying and hierarchizing 
the European human rights order, and thus strengthen the rule of law and legal certainty for 
everybody. 
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